Could 2-of-2 multisig be a reasonable middle ground between single-sig and 2-of-3?

Recent incidents like the Coldcard entropy vulnerability and the reported hardware implant found in a Ledger device sold through CryptoBilis have made me rethink how I secure my self-custodied Bitcoin.

A BIP-39 passphrase can help if someone gets your seed, but what if a compromised device can also capture your passphrase or interfere with the signing process? Single-sig still leaves you relying on one key, creating a potential single point of failure.

For people who find 2-of-3 multisig too expensive or complicated, could 2-of-2 be a reasonable alternative?

I'm thinking of using two independently generated keys in separate environments. For example, a PC wallet (Electrum or Sparrow) paired with a mobile wallet (BlueWallet or Nunchuk), or a hardware wallet (Trezor or Ledger) paired with a PC or mobile wallet. If one device is compromised through a supply chain attack, the attacker would still need the second key to spend the funds. Of course, using different devices and apps only helps if the keys and their backups are genuinely independent.

I know the biggest objection is that 2-of-2 has no redundancy. Lose either key permanently and your Bitcoin is gone. That's a serious trade-off, and I understand why people prefer 2-of-3. But if both keys and their backups are managed carefully, could the added protection against a single compromised device be worth it?

I'm not suggesting 2-of-2 is better than 2-of-3. I'm wondering whether it's an overlooked middle ground for people who want to reduce single points of failure without taking on the full cost and complexity of 2-of-3.

What do you think? Would you consider this setup, or does the risk of losing access outweigh the security benefits?